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Abstract: We analyze the labor supply and income effects of a needs-based minimum benefit 
system (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung”) to be introduced in Austria by the end of 
this/beginning of next year. The aim of this reform is to reduce poverty as well as increasing 
employment rates of recipients of social assistance. On the basis of a behavioral microsimula-
tion model we show that this new system will slightly increase incomes for the poorest 
households and slightly reduce labor supply due to the generous allowances for marginal em-
ployment under the current and the planned regulations of unemployment assistance. As an 
alternative, we analyze a reform proposal which reduces financial incentives for marginal 
employment not covered by social security, and rewards working longer hours by a wage sub-
sidy. Although this alternative reform would yield modest positive labor supply effects, a 
relatively large number of households would suffer income losses. 
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1 Introduction 
Unemployment rates in Austria are traditionally lower than in most other 
OECD countries (see, e.g. OECD, 2010, for the latest rates), although unemployment of low-
qualified Austrians has recently been strongly increasing. For example, the rate among men 
having completed only compulsory education increased from 7.2% in autumn 2008 to 12.5% 
a year later. For low-qualified women, the rate increased from 8.6% to 10.4% in the same 
period (Statistik Austria, 2009). 
Thus, designing policy measures capable of reducing unemployment among low-
qualified persons and improving incentives to take up low-wage jobs is a primary issue on the 
social policy agenda in Austria as well as its fellow OECD countries. In the US and the UK, 
for example, wage subsidies like the “earned income tax credit” (EITC) or “family credits” 
have been in place for many years (see, e.g., Meyer and Holtz-Eakin, 2002; Blundell, 2006) 
and have in the recent past provoked interest of policy advisors also in Germany and Austria 
(Steiner, 2006). In Germany, several proposals aimed at improving the opportunities to earn 
money with low wage jobs have recently been brought up. Some of these proposals feature 
wage-subsidies for recipients of means-tested unemployment assistance who take up jobs with 
a few hours of work, but also cutbacks of transfers for the unemployed rejecting job offers 
(see, e.g. Sinn et al, 2006, Steiner, 2004), which probably is why politicians have been reluc-
tant to support them. Other recent proposals favor wage-subsidies to employees earning low 
hourly wages in jobs covered by the social security system and the abolishment of the implicit 
subsidy of so called “mini-jobs” which are exempt from social security contribution (see Haan 
and Steiner, 2007 for an evaluation of alternative recent reform proposals). 
In Austria, the system of social assistance, which is organized by the federal states and 
features different rules in each of the nine states, will be replaced by a comprehensive system 
called needs-based minimum benefit” (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung” BMS) by the 
end of this/beginning of next year. While within the existing system of social assistance in 
Austria, transfer applicants have to turn to the local municipalities, receivers of BMS are to be 
supervised by the unemployment agency (“Arbeitsmarktservice”). The primary aims of the 
new system are combating poverty, harmonizing the different existing regulations and pre-
venting non-take up. However, the new system is also intended to work as a stepping stone 
enabling the unemployed to move into regular full-time employment in due course.  
In this study we show that the introduction of the proposed BMS will hardly improve fi-
nancial incentives to take up or increase employment. In fact, our simulation results show 
even a small overall decline in labor market participation and total working hours. We, there-
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fore, also evaluate an alternative reform proposal which combines the same standard rates as 
the BMS proposal and somewhat more generous financial incentives to take up regular em-
ployment including (partial) refunds of the social security contributions as well transfer cut-
backs for people who are reluctant to take up a job. Our simulation results show that, although 
this reform alternative would yield modest positive labor supply effects, a relatively large 
number of households would suffer income losses. This illustrates, the budgetary constraints, 
the limitations of increasing financial work incentives in welfare states with a relatively high 
level of means-tested out-of-work benefits, of which Austria is a prime example. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the prevailing system of unem-
ployment benefits and social assistance, the BMS as well as the alternative reform proposal 
analyzed here. Section 3 describes our simulation approach. Simulation results showing the 
effects of the BMS and the alternative reform proposal on household budget constraints, labor 
supply, household incomes and fiscal costs are reported and discussed in Section 4, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes. 
2 The prevailing and planned social welfare systems, and an alternative 
reform proposal 
2.1 The prevailing welfare system 
Currently, the Austrian system of social safety features, next to quite generous and uni-
versal allowances for childcare and children, two types of unemployment insurance payments 
and a means-tested social assistance system. If a person becomes unemployed, she will re-
ceive the “unemployment benefit” (“Arbeitslosengeld”, UB) for the first 20 weeks1 of unem-
ployment. The amount of this transfer is 55% of the previous net income and paid as a daily 
benefit. In 2010 the maximum monthly UB amount is 55 percent of the upper social security 
threshold of € 4110. Since the UB is considered to be based on the insurance principle (AMS, 
2009), it is not means tested. 
Thereafter there is “unemployment assistance” (“Notstandshilfe”, UA) until unemploy-
ment ends. It is slightly smaller (92%) than the UB and means tested. However, there are gen-
erous allowances for income of spouses, and income of other household members does not 
count at all. The maximum amount is € 901 and € 772.4 per month, depending on how long 
                                                 
1 If the employee has been employed for at least 156 weeks during the last 5 years, the UB is paid for 30 weeks. 
If the employee is older than 40 and has been employed for at least 312 weeks during the last 10 years, the dura-
tion is 40 weeks, and for employees older than 50 who have been employed for 468 weeks during the last 
15 years, the duration is 52 weeks. 
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the UB has been received prior to receiving UA. Both payments require showing efforts in 
finding a job as well as being able to take up a new job. Both the UB and UA include a small 
family supplement of € 29.7 per month and dependent child (AMS, 2009). 
Also, for recipients of both UB and UA there is an allowance on earnings of up to 
€ 366.33 (paid 14 times a year2), while there is no such allowance for recipients of social as-
sistance. For earnings exceeding this amount, the benefit-withdrawal rate of UB and UA is 
100 percent. As Figure 1 shows, this implies that the monthly net income of a single person 
receiving an hourly wage at the 25th percentile of the wage distribution and working 30 hours 
a week is the same as receiving UA and when working only 9 hours.  
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Source: ATTM 
Note: We assume an hourly wage of € 10.7, which is the 25th percentile of the observed hourly wages (both 
genders), and that this person has been employed for 40 hours per week prior to unemployment (which deter-
mines the amount of the unemployment assistance payments. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that the third pillar of the Austrian social safety system, social assis-
tance (“Sozialhilfe”, SA), applies and supplements household income in case it is lower than 
some pre-specified standard rate. In the case shown in the graph, the standard rate3 is as high 
as the income of a person receiving the 25th percentile of the hourly wage distribution and 
working 20 hours per week. 
                                                 
2 Typically, in Austria wages are paid 14 times a year (12 monthly payments plus a holiday and a Christmas 
allowance, each accounting for one regular monthly wage payment). 
3 Since the standard rates differ across the nine federal states, we show the standard rate for Vienna in this and all 
the following graphs. 
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Since single-parents are often not able to take up a job due to child care responsibilities 
and the limited availability of subsidized child care facilities, and are therefore not eligible to 
UB or UA, this group represents a large share of all persons receiving SA. Moreover, self-
employed persons with no income and no entitlement to unemployment insurance payments 
are also entitled to SA. Finally, since there is no lower limit for UB and UA, social assistance 
might be paid to supplement UB or UA payments, if these are lower than the standard rates 
for SA. 
The amount of social assistance is determined by the difference between a respective 
standard rate and actual household income, including all sources of income plus transfer in-
come plus realizable (“exploitable”) assets.45. Standard rates for SA are intended to cover the 
typical cost of living at the bottom of the distribution of household incomes. All federal states 
provide additional payments for renting, and some states also irregular payments, including 
the coverage of the costs for heating in winter or for clothing. Recipients of SA are also enti-
tled to free medical treatment by use of a special health insurance certificate (“Sozialhil-
fekrankenschein”).  
Typically, the standard rates of SA are paid 14 times a year, which results in quite gener-
ous benefits. Table 1 shows the monthly benefits in the existing social safety system as well as 
in the planned system (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung”) and the alternative reform 
proposal described below. We have taken into consideration that the existing system typically 
features 14 payments a year and have thus adjusted the values such that they represent 
monthly payments made 12 times a year.  
As shown by Table 1, the payments vary considerably across the federal states, and some 
payments are fairly generous. The drawback of this generosity is that the SA payments intro-
duce an “implicit” minimum wage (Sinn et al., 2006, Müller and Steiner, 2010) since people 
are likely to be unwilling to take up a job yielding less than the SA payment. Note however, 
that prior to receiving SA payments, all financial as well as other assets will have to be ex-
ploited6 such that many people are reluctant to take the benefit instead of a job. If the federal 
state has no maximum payment for renting, the rates shown in Table 1 include the median of 
renting costs observed in our data. 
                                                 
4 These are monetary assets as well as property not used for own residence. There are, however, restrictions in 
some federal states. In Carinthia, for example, monetary assets up to € 7,590 do not reduce the amount of social 
assistance. 
5 The nationwide family allowances are not included in the income subtracted from the standard rates when de-
termining the payment, however, as can be seen from the Table, the standard rates for persons eligible for the 
nationwide family allowance are typically lower. 
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Table 1: Parameters of the prevailing and new welfare systems, and of the  
alternative reform proposal 
   Social assistance 









Burgenland 744.0 558.0 558.0 166.8 
Carinthia 731.1 1) 635.0 635.0 177.1 
Lower Austria 731.6 654.8 348.1 170.9 
Upper Austria 5) 1000.5 807.1 595.4 189.0 
Salzburg 2) 841.9 673.3 497.7 181.4 
Styria 888.1 707.7 514.1 197.2 
Tyrol 5) 846.2 652.4 510.0 181.7 







Vienna 776.0 1) 522.5 522.5 137.0 
Standard rate (€) 744.0 558.0 558.0 133.9 
Income allowance rate 15% 
Minimum income allowance (€) 52.1 













































Standard rate (€) 744.0 558.0 558.0 133.9 
Income allowance rate 15% 
Minimum income allowance (€) - 
Maximum income allowance (€) - 
Cut if not employed 
15% if employable and working less than 15 
hours/week 
60% of SSC if working more than 15 hours 
100% if working more than 30 hours 















SS contribution subsidy 
Introduction of SSC for incomes below marginal in-






1) This rate also applies for single parents 
2) Income allowance of € 134 for fulltime and € 67 for part-time employment 
5) Full renting cost are refunded in case they are appropriate 
Note: UA and SA amounts are adjusted to 12 monthly payments. They include the standard rate as well as 
cost for renting and, if applicable, heating. In case full renting costs are paid, we assume they are the median 
of the observed costs.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 If the person receiving SA owns a house, for example, she will be allowed to further use it, however, the au-
thorities will claim ownership. 
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2.2 The new welfare system (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung”) 
By the end of this/beginning of next year, the current social assistance (SA) system will 
be replaced by a “needs-based minimum benefit” (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung”, 
BMS), although the generous allowances for income from marginal employment of recipients 
of unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance payments will stay in place. We will 
see later that this poses a problem since keeping UA and UB weakens labor supply incentives. 
Nonetheless, BMS differs in many important aspects from the current SA system.  
First, there are different standard rates including coverage of renting as well as heating 
(see Table 1). The BMS standard rates are equal to the rates for minimum pensions (“Aus-
gleichszulagenpensionen”) in Austria. Single individuals will receive € 744 and couples € 
1,116 per month. Unlike in the prevailing system, this will be paid 12 rather than 14 times a 
year. However, these standard rates are minimum rates and several federal states will offer 
surcharges for the standard transfer rates and keep some irregular benefits, e.g. for clothing7. 
Moreover, the federal states agreed to guarantee the prevailing amount of social assistance to 
those who currently receive it. Thus, if BMS were lower than SA, which Table 1 shows to be 
the case for several states and household types, people receiving SA when BMS is introduced 
will be paid the difference such that their transfer income will not be reduced. Thus, the long-
term impact of the reform will differ significantly from its short-term impact due to this 
“grandfathering” of SA entitlements.  
Second, there is an asset allowance of € 3,750 such that financial assets below this 
amount do not need to be exploited prior to receiving the transfer.  
Third, and most importantly for our purposes, if a benefit recipient takes up a job, 15% of 
her income, but at least € 52.1 and at most € 126.5 will not be deducted from the transfer. 
Fourth, if transfer recipients are unwilling to take up a job, although they repeatedly have 
received job offers, the transfer will be cut by up to 50%. Up until now, there is no strict guid-
ance of this procedure and we thus cannot predict how often it will be applied in practice.  
Fifth, as noted already above, BMS recipients will, unlike SA recipients, be supervised 
by the unemployment agency, which should facilitate bringing them together with potential 
employers. 
Sixth, BMS recipients will have health insurance while SA recipients are currently enti-
tled to free medical treatment by making use of special certificates (“Sozialhilfekranken-
                                                 
7 At the time of writing (September 2010), decisions on the exact amounts of transfer rates are still pending in six 
of nine federal states.  
 7
scheine”). Health insurance for BMS recipients will be financed by paying a fraction of 5.1% 
of the standard rates to the federal health insurance fund.  
 
2.3 An alternative reform proposal 
The alternative reform proposal is related to the needs-based minimum benefit system 
(“BMS”) by its standard rates for singles, household heads, spouses and children as well as 
the income allowance rates, but differs in three important ways. 
First, unemployment assistance (“Notstandshilfe”, UA) is merged with SA under the al-
ternative reform proposal. This implies that if someone is still unemployed after the unem-
ployment insurance payment (“Arbeitslosengeld”, UB) has expired, she will have to rely on 
social assistance with the BMS’ standard rates and means-testing procedure. This will lead to 
income losses for persons who had high unemployment benefits and who profited from the 
limited means testing regulations of UA. Abolishment of UA and removing the generous im-
plicit subsidies for marginal employment is, as we will see later, for improving financial in-
centives to work longer hours and earn wage income above the marginal social security thre-
shold. Furthermore, since UA is a means-tested social transfer, there is no obvious reason for 
linking its amount to the individual UB level.  
Second, while the income allowance rate of 15% is retained, the minimum allowance of 
€ 52.1 and the maximum allowance of € 126.5 are abolished. This makes the budget con-
straints steeper for wage incomes below € 347.3 per month (= € 52.1/0.15) and above € 843.3 
(= € 126.5/0.15) and thus improves financial work incentives. The reform proposal also re-
moves the implicit subsidy for marginal employment and subjects yearly wage incomes below 
the marginal employment limit to social security contributions. Instead, social security contri-
butions on regular employment at low wages will be subsidized. The subsidy rate depends on 
hours worked: If employment exceeds 15 hours a week, 60% of social security contributions 
will be refunded; if working hours are more than 30 hours a week, social security contribu-
tions will be fully refunded. The full amount of this subsidy will be granted if monthly gross 
earnings are below € 8008. For higher earnings, the subsidy rates of 60% or 100% will be in-
crementally reduced below an amount of monthly gross earnings of € 1,500. For monthly 
earnings above € 1,500, no subsidy of social security contributions applies anymore. 
Finally, the proposed welfare reform features transfer cutbacks of 15% of the respective 
standard rate for people who are employable, but are working less than 15 hours a week. We 
 8
define being employable as being younger than 65 and not taking care of children younger 
than 14 or other household members who need care. Thus, there is no transfer cutback for 
single parents or for single individuals who take care of, e.g., elderly relatives. Also, there is 
no cutback for couples with children as long as one partner works for more than 15 hours per 
week. However, if a couple has no children, both spouses will have to work longer than 
15 hours a week in order to prevent the transfer cutback. 
Thus, the reform proposal contains elements of both the needs-based BMS and welfare 
reforms already implemented or discussed in other EU member states. It rewards regular em-
ployment of people with low earnings potential within the social security system and removes 
the prevailing implicit subsidies of both marginal employment and working a few hours while 
living on means-tested unemployment assistance.  
3 Empirical methodology 
Our empirical analysis of the labor supply and income effects of the planned and pro-
posed welfare reforms described in the previous section is based on the behavioral mircosimu-
lation model ATTM (Austrian Tax-Transfer Model, see Steiner and Wakolbinger, 2009). 
ATTM incorporates a comprehensive image of the various components of the Austrian tax-
transfer system including all the interactions among them at the level of individual house-
holds. ATTM is based on data from the EU-SILC (Survey on Income and Living Conditions) 
survey conducted by Statistik Austria (2006). This representative sample of 6,028 Austrian 
households includes data on sociodemographic characteristics, household incomes as well as 
current employment status and hours worked of adult household members. For a detailed data 
description, see Steiner and Wakolbinger (2009). Using ATTM and detailed household data, 
we can derive net household incomes under both the current and alternative welfare systems 
accounting for changes in household labor supply induced by these reforms. Here, we only 
simulate the short-term effects of the reforms accounting for the “grandfathering” of SA enti-
tlements described in Section  0 above, and do not account for longer-term effects when the 
new system is fully phased in.  
The estimation of the labor supply effects of the two analyzed welfare reforms is based 
on a structural household labor supply model as suggested by van Soest (1995) and applied by 
Steiner et al. (2008), among others. The discrete-choice model implemented in ATTM as-
                                                                                                                                                        
8 In the Austrian system, someone who earns a monthly wage of € 800 would each month receive a payment of 
€ 685.71 and two extra payments (holiday and Christmas allowance) of € 685.71 each. 
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sumes that the observed households can choose between J working hour categories. One of 
these categories typically represents unemployment, i.e. zero working hours. For estimating 
the labor supply impacts presented in the following section, we chose to specify six working 
hours categories for women (0, 1-12, 13-20, 21-34, 35-40 and more than 40 hours) and only 
four for men (0, 1-20, 21-40 and more than 40 hours). The estimations are performed sepa-
rately for male and female singles (950 and 976 households respectively), women with in-
flexible spouse (778 households), men with inflexible spouse (225 households) and couple 
households where both partners are flexible (1703 households).  
A decisive advantage of discrete-choice labor supply models is that non-linearities in 
household budget constraints can be modeled much easier than using more traditional specifi-
cations of continuous labor supply models. Another important advantage is that they allow, in 
combination with a microsimulation model like ATTM, to account for the endogeneity of net 
household income in a consistent way. This is achieved by calculating for each household and 
each of the discrete choices (hours categories) a counterfactual net household income using 
ATTM. Estimation of hourly wages of currently non-employed people is based on the two-
step Heckman (1979) procedure which accounts for potential selection bias with respect to the 
individual’s employment decision.9 Under the assumption of constant gross hourly wages 
across labor supply categories, there is a corresponding level of disposable income for each 
household i choosing hour category j.  
Since the current version of ATTM does not model the household’s savings decision, 
disposable income corresponds to the household’s consumption level, ijC . The household 
utility function therefore is 
iiijijijij ZCLmLfUV ε+= ),,,(  
which assigns for each possible choice j of hour-categories a utility level V depending on the 
leisure of the female and male partner in household i, ijLf and ijLm , their disposable income 
or consumption ijC , some household characteristics iZ  and an error term iε . 
We assume a quadratic specification of the deterministic part of the utility function as 
                                                 
9 In ATTM, estimation is performed separately for women and men. In the first step, the probability of being 
employed is estimated by a binary probit model with marital status, the number and age of children a dummy 
indicating whether a person has ever been employed as well as household income included as explanatory vari-
ables in addition to the variables also included in the wage regression.  In the second-step wage regression esti-
mated on the sub-sample of currently employed people and including the selection term from the first stage, the 


















Of course, we would expect the marginal utility to be positive with respect to income and 
leisure of both spouses, and decreasing in the level of income and leisure consumed.10 Theory 
does not, however, imply restrictions on the sign of the marginal utility of one spouse’s lei-
sure to changes in the level of the other spouse’s leisure. This specification of the utility func-
tion does not restrict substitution between leisure and consumption to be independent of the 
utility level or income. In fact, elasticities may vary freely across households, depending on 
the level of income, the level of leisure or working hours of the two spouses, and household 
composition. The specification of the utility function allows for varying household prefer-
ences by employing “taste shifters” which affect the coefficients of the linear income and lei-
sure terms, i.e.: 
1 0 1 1
3 0 2 1














X1, X2 and X3 are column vectors including sociodemographic characteristics like age, 
number and age of children, disability indicators and whether the observed person is Austrian 
citizen, and the α’s are vectors of coefficients which are jointly estimated with the β’s from 
the utility function above. 
If the error terms iε  are assumed to be independently and identically distributed across 
hour categories and households according to the Extreme-Value type I (EVI) distribution, the 











The decision rule is simple: Alternative k is chosen if the net income and the level of lei-
sure under this alternative yield a utility index which is greater than that for any other alterna-
                                                                                                                                                        
and variables describing an individual’s previous labor market history, and dummy variables for region, industry 
and firm size.  
10 The utility function for a single household is a special case of the above equation, with β9, and, depending on 
whether the household head is female or male, the respective coefficients on male and female leisure being re-
stricted to zero. 
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tive. This specification implies that individuals and households are not restricted in their 
choice of hours. Estimation results for the labor supply are reported in the Appendix. Based 
on these estimates, the expected values of individual working hours and participation rates 
can be derived under the prevailing and alternative welfare systems.  
 
4 Simulation results 
4.1 Budget constraints  
We first present for “representative” households plots of monthly household income 
against the number of hours worked per week under the alternative welfare systems presented 
above. These figures provide a clear image of the financial incentives to increase labor supply 
(i.e. the number of working hours) under each welfare system. The steeper the budget con-
straint, the more an additional working hour pays off and the higher we expect the incentives 
to increase labor supply to be. 
Singles without children 
The upper part of Figure 2 shows the budget constraints for singles with an hourly wage 
of € 10.7 (the 25th percentile of the wage distribution of both genders) who are, in the prevail-
ing system, entitled to receive unemployment assistance. This means that they have paid un-
employment insurance payments prior to unemployment. We assume that the individual 
whose budget constraint is shown has worked for 40 hours per week before becoming unem-
ployed at the given hourly wage. If she had worked less, the unemployment assistance would 
be lower. 
Figure 2 a) shows that for the representative individual, the prevailing system offers high 
incentives to work around 9 hours. If the individual would work more than that, she would 
lose the unemployment benefit and her income would thus decrease. To be more specific, her 
income would fall back to the prevailing social assistance standard rates. At around 30 work-
ing hours per week, this individual would achieve the income level she generated with only 9 
working hours. 
Moreover, the figure also shows that the planned system (“BMS”) would not change this 
structure. Due to the more generous income allowance rates, net income generated by work-
ing from 10 to around 22 hours per week would slightly increase. However, the peak in the 
budget constraint at 9 working hours would not disappear, since with introduction of BMS, 
the unemployment assistance (UA) system still prevails. Thus, we expect that within the new 
system, the incentives to increase labor supply will hardly improve. 
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Within the system alternative system, however, working less than 15 hours is punished 
by a transfer cutback of 15%, while working longer than 15 hours is rewarded by a subsidy of 
75% of the social security contributions. Moreover, with removal of UA, the incentive-
distorting peak at 9 working hours vanishes. Thus, net income is strictly increasing in working 
hours, and we expect labor supply to increase.  
 
Figure 2: Budget constraints of singles without children entitled to  























0 10 20 30 40 50



























0 10 20 30 40 50





Note: We assume an hourly wage of € 10.7, which is the 25th percentile of the observed hourly wages (both 
genders). For the amount of the unemployment assistance payment we assume that the person has been em-
ployed for 40 hours per week prior to unemployment. For social assistance we assume that the person is not 
entitled to unemployment assistance. 
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The lower part of Figure 2 shows the budget constraints for a single with no children who 
is not entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Here, we expect that an increase of labor 
supply which the system we propose would bring about will not be as big as for individuals 
entitled to unemployment assistance. However, there should still be an increase because, as 
noted already, our system punishes low working hours and rewards high working hours, and 
the budget constraint within our system is strictly increasing in the number of working hours. 
We expect the introduction of BMS, which includes an income allowance of 15%, to in-
crease labor supply of singles without children entitled to social assistance. Note, however, 
that because of the minimum income allowance of € 52.1, the income generated with around 
three working hours does not differ from the income generated with 10 working hours a week. 
Singles with children 
In Figure 3 we plot the budget constraints for singles with two children. Again, we as-
sume their hourly wage to be the 25th percentile of the wage distribution of both genders 
(€ 10.7). Whether or not a single with two children was entitled to receive unemployment 
assistance, her income is considerably higher than that of a single without children. This is 
due to the fairly generous Austrian family allowances which are paid without any means-
testing. If a single with two children was in the prevailing system entitled to unemployment 
assistance (Figure 3), the household income would peak at nine working hours (see the same 
pattern in Figure 1 and Figure 2) and fall with more than 9 hours back to the level of the SA 
standard rate. Again, the household budgets generated with 9 and 30 working hours are equal. 
While the introduction of BMS would not remove the peak in the budget constraint, it would 
be removed if the reform proposal was introduced. We would expect BMS to have no impact 
on labor supply, while we expect an increase in labor supply under the alternative proposal. 
Note that there is no transfer cutback if the individual works less than 15 hours a week in this 
case because single parents are not defined as being employable.  
For single parents entitled to social assistance, we expect the effects on the budget con-
straint which BMS would bring about are not much different from the effects the alternative 
proposal would trigger. As can be seen from Figure 3, the budget constraints overlap for 
workloads between 10 and 25 hours per week. For people who work less than 10 hours, BMS 
would provide slightly more income, while those who work more than 25 hours are made 
better off in the system we propose. Thus, labor supply should be slightly higher for the alter-
native proposal. In general, however, both BMS and the alternative proposal should bring 
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about higher labor supply than the prevailing system does, because both BMS and the alterna-
tive proposal reward employment with an income allowance of 15%. 
 
Figure 3: Budget constraints of singles with two children entitled to  
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Note: We assume an hourly wage of € 10.7, which is the 25th percentile of the observed hourly wages (both 







Figure 4 shows the budget constraints for a couple with two children, where one spouse is 
out of the labor force and the other has an hourly wage of € 12.23, which is the 25th percentile 
of the distribution of observed male hourly wages. For such a household, it is irrelevant 
whether the wage-earner is entitled to receive unemployment- or social assistance within the 
prevailing system, since the social assistance standard rates are higher than the maximum 
amount of unemployment assistance11. Figure 4 shows that the single-earner receiving the 
25th percentile of hourly wages would have to work more than 30 hours per week in order to 
exceed the social assistance standard rate plus the family allowance. Within the BMS system, 
the wage-earner could increase income although receiving the benefit because of the income 
allowance of 15%. Within the system we propose, however, working less than 15 hours per 
week would be punished by a transfer cutback of 15%, while working more than 15 hours 
would be rewarded by the subsidy social security contributions. We thus expect labor supply 
of one-earner couples to be highest within the system we propose, and labor supply within the 
BMS system to be higher than within the prevailing system.  
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Note: We assume one spouse to be out of the labor force and the other one to have an hourly wage of € 12.23, 
which is the 25th percentile of the observed male hourly wages. This person varies his labor supply as depicted 
in the Figure. 
 
                                                 
11 If the couple had exploitable assets and was therefore reluctant to apply for social assistance, the social assis-
tance standard rates would not apply and the budget constraint would be different. 
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4.2 Labor supply and participation rates 
Table 2 shows the estimated changes in labor market participation rates, hours worked 
and full-time equivalents induced by the introduction of the BMS or the alternative reform 
proposal. As shown by the table, the estimated change of individual participation rates is 
slightly negative (-0.038 percentage points) for the BMS and positive (0.467 percentage 
points) for the alternative reform proposal. For this latter proposal, participation rates in-
crease, on average, for both women and men living in couples as well as for female and male 
singles. For the BMS, female singles are the only group for whom we estimate a small in-
crease in labor market participation, on average, while estimated effects are negative for 
spouses as well as male singles. 
Estimated changes in working hours show the same pattern. For the introduction of 
BMS, the mean change is -0.108 percent, compared to 0.942 percent estimated for the alterna-
tive reform proposal. Note however that estimated standard errors of these estimates are fairly 
large. 
Estimated individual changes in labor force participation rates and hours worked result, 
on average, in an expected reduction in labor supply of about 600 full-time equivalents under 
BMS. In contrast, under the alternative reform proposal total labor supply would increase by 
about 13,000 full-time equivalents, of which 43% stems from increasing labor supply of 
women living in couples.  
 
Table 2: Simulated changes in labor supply, participation rates and full-time equivalents 
 Couples Singles Total 
 Women  Men Women Men  














































  full-time equivalents 
BMS -445 -508 479 -115 -589 
Alternative Proposal 5,762 5,044 1,666 262 12,733 
* standard errors in parentheses 
 
The pattern shown by Table 2 largely confirms what is expected from looking at the 
budget constraints shown in Section 4.1. Estimated labor supply effects under the two reforms 
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increases are consistent with stronger financial incentives to increase working hours under the 
alternative reform proposal compared to the BMS. However, the simulated reduction in labor 
supply under the BMS was not to be expected from the implied budget constraints shown for 
“representative” households in Section 4.1.  
4.3 Distributional effects 
In Table 3 we show simulated distributional effects of the BMS and the alternative reform 
proposal on monthly net equivalence income. We have divided the sample into four catego-
ries defined by net equivalence income classes (NEIC). Out of a total population of eight mil-
lion people, 450,000 persons belong to the lowest NEIC; they have less than 50% of the aver-
age monthly net equivalence income of € 1,833. Roughly less than 4.5 million people belong 
to the second NEIC (50-100% of average monthly net equivalence income), 2.4 million to the 
third NEIC (100-150%) and 740,000 to the highest (> 150%). 
Table 3: Distributional effects of the BMS and the alternative proposal 
  more income less income 









 without labor supply effects 
< 50% 77,226 97.5     
50 – 100% 19,851 11.8   
100 - 150% 819 2.8   B
M
S 
> 150%         
 Total 97,896       
< 50% 65,244 101.5 16,901 -71.5 
50 – 100% 35,065 42.2 51,739 -110.9 












> 150% 3,832 24.9 1,307 -118.4 
 Total 111,242   79,029   
 with labor supply effects 
< 50% 78,303 96.2 2,227 -8.9 
50 – 100% 36,170 6.8 24,174 -1.7 
100 - 150% 6,669 0.2 4,833 -0.7 B
M
S 
> 150% 911 0.0 3,913 -0.1 
 Total 122,053   35,147   
< 50% 67,955 97.9 14,190 -82.6 
50 – 100% 34,455 57.5 52,349 -112.6 












> 150% 3,832 38.4 1,307 -115.9 
  Total 113,679   76,592   
 
Table 3 shows how many persons of each NEIC will be, respectively, positively and 
negatively affected by the reforms. In addition, the average estimated monetary gain or loss is 
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reported. Without consideration of potential changes of labor supply, the introduction of BMS 
would not trigger any income losses since the prevailing amount of social assistance is guar-
anteed by the federal states. Net equivalence income of 77,000 persons belonging to the low-
est NEIC will increase by slightly less than € 100 per month, on average. In the second and 
third highest NEIC, less persons are affected, and the monetary gains are only about € 12 and 
€ 3, respectively. Allowing for labor supply shifts does not change these effects much. How-
ever, since the estimated elasticities are low and negative, some 35,000 persons are estimated 
to incur slight negative monetary effects. 
If the alternative reform proposal came into place, slightly more persons would see posi-
tive income effects. Apart from the lowest NEIC, these positive income effects would be 
more substantial than under the planned reform. This is due to more generous allowances of 
employment income. However, almost 80,000 persons would be negatively affected, and for 
these people the average loss would be quite substantial. In the lowest NEIC; the negative 
effect is somewhat weaker, while in the other NEICs, the estimated negative monetary effects 
on net equivalence income exceed € 100 per month. To a large extent, those negative effects 
are due to the replacement of unemployment assistance by a reformed social assistance which 
is lower and has less generous allowances for spouses’ income and assets. 
4.4 Fiscal effects 
Table 4 shows the simulated fiscal effects of the introduction of BMS and the alternative 
reform proposal. Introducing BMS would provoke no change in income tax and social secu-
rity contributions. Moreover, the amount of paid unemployment assistance would not change 
since it is planned to retain the prevailing system of unemployment benefits and assistance 
when BMS is introduced. Social assistance payments would rise by € 295 mn. (assuming a 
100% take-up rate in both the BMS as well as the prevailing system). Although the BMS 
standard transfer rates are lower than the standard rates of the prevailing system for the major-
ity of federal states (see Table 4), social assistance payments would rise. One reason for this is 
that the federal states agreed to prevent income losses of transfer recipients and to pay the 
difference if the transfer in the BMS system was lower than in the existing one. Another rea-
son lies in the income allowance rates, which leave some income unconsidered when deter-
mining the transfer rate. 
The introduction of the alternative reform proposal would slightly increase income tax 
revenues due to increased labor supply, while social security contribution revenues would 
shrink by € 383 mn. because of the SSC-subsidy for wage-earners who work more than 15 
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hours per week. Unemployment assistance payments would become obsolete because this 
system is to be abolished, which would reduce expenditures by € 275.8 mn. However, social 
assistance payments would rise by € 36 mn. due to higher transfers paid to those who received 
social assistance under the current system. Table 4 shows that, due to the positive labor supply 
and employment effects, the introduction of the alternative reform proposal is estimated to 
improve the total budget by a small amount of € 67 mn. 
Table 4: Fiscal effects of the BMS and the alternative reform proposal, in mn. € 
  Status Quo  BMS Alternative reform proposal 
   without LS with LS without LS with LS 
Income Tax 23,564.3 0.0 -4.5 0.0 21.2 
SS Contributions 39,018.6 0.0 -6.6 -383.0 -236.0 
Unemployment assistance -965.3 -7.5 -14.7 275.8 313.0 
Social assistance -441.2 -139.1 -141.7 -36.0 -30.6 
Total   -146.6 -167.5 -143.2 67.6 
5 Conclusion 
By the end of this/beginning of next year the Austrian government and the federal states 
plan to introduce a needs-based minimum benefit system (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsi-
cherung”, BMS) which will replace the prevailing system of social assistance. The main ad-
vantages of BMS are seen in harmonizing the different transfer rates (each federal state has 
different rates), in inducing re-entry to the labor market by supervising transfer recipients by 
the unemployment agency and in providing incentives for taking up work by introducing a 
small allowance for earned income for recipients of BMS. In the existing system, there are 
very little work incentives for recipients of social assistance because each Euro of additional 
wage income reduces the transfer by one Euro. 
Our simulation results based on the Austrian Tax-Transfer Model ATTM show, however, 
that the introduction of BMS will not increase labor supply of transfer recipients. By analyz-
ing the budget constraints of various model households (singles without children, singles with 
children, one-earner couples with children) we show that introducing BMS does not improve 
labor supply incentives because even after the introduction of BMS the system of unemploy-
ment benefits and unemployment assistance will still prevail. This system still features gener-
ous and implicit subsidies for marginal employment as well as large transfer cutbacks if wage 
income exceeds the marginal income limit (“Geringfügigkeitsgrenze”). Furthermore, for peo-
ple receiving SA when BMS is introduced their transfer income will not be reduced, and this 
grandfathering” of SA entitlements is also modeled in our simulation. Thus, the long-term 
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impact of the reform will differ significantly from its short-term impact when the new system 
applies to all recipients of SA and means-tested out-of-work benefits, respectively. 
We have also analyzed an alternative reform proposal which combines the same standard 
rates and an income allowance rate as BMS but in addition merges unemployment assistance 
and social assistance, abolishes the implicit subsidy of marginal employment, and imposes a 
transfer cutback if employable individuals work less than 15 hours per week. If employees 
work more than that, however, they are granted a subsidy of their social security contributions 
which is gradually reduced as income increases. This proposal is calibrated to make it revenue 
neutral without accounting for potential labor supply effects. In fact, our simulations show 
that it will yield small budgetary revenues if positive labor supply effects are taken into ac-
count. The introduction of this alternative reform proposal would increase labor supply by a 
total of some 13,000 full-time equivalents but almost 80,000 persons would suffer income 
losses under this reform, and for these people the average loss would be quite substantial. 
Given the structure of the current Austrian welfare system it seems fairly difficult to invent 
budgetary-neutral reforms which improve financial work incentives without reducing non-
work income for those currently receiving relatively high means-tested social transfers. 
Our simulation results are likely to underestimate the long-term effect of the analyzed 
welfare reforms on labor supply and household incomes due to the “grandfathering” of SA 
entitlements. On the other hand, we currently do not account for incomplete take-up of 
means-tested transfers in our simulations, and the take-up rate may well be affected by a 
change of the nature of these transfers under the analyzed reforms. To account for these po-
tentially important factors in simulations of welfare reforms is a topic for future research.  
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 category category category category category 
monthly net income -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
monthly net income² 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] 
women’s leisure time -0.055 0.091 0.087   
 [0.038] [0.064] [0.038]**   
men’s leisure time 0.236   0.325 0.132 
 [0.045]***   [0.118]*** [0.040]***
women’s leisure² 0.001 0.001 0   
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]   
men’s leisure² -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.000]***   [0.000]*** [0.000]***
income × women’s leisure 0 0 0   
 [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]***   
income × men’s leisure 0   0 0 
 [0.000]   [0.000]** [0.000] 
women’s leisure × Austrian 0.021 0.076 0.005   
 [0.016] [0.028]*** [0.014]   
men’s leisure × Austrian 0.023   -0.051 -0.01 
 [0.023]   [0.057] [0.019] 
women’s leisure × age -0.004 -0.014 -0.007   
 [0.002]** [0.002]*** [0.001]***   
women’s leisure × age² 0 0 0   
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***   
men’s leisure × age -0.007   -0.008 -0.002 
 [0.002]***   [0.004]* [0.001] 
men’s leisure × age² 0   0 0 
 [0.000]***   [0.000]** [0.000] 
women’s leisure × men’s leisure 0     
 [0.000]     
women’s leisure × men’s leisure ×  
Austrian 0     
 [0.000]     
Income × Austrian 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 



















 category category category category category 
income² × Austrian 0 0 0 0 0 
 [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000] 
women's leisure × somewhat handicapped 0.007 0.007 0.065   
 [0.010] [0.012] [0.012]***   
women's leisure × severely handicapped 0.005 0.013 0.008   
 [0.005] [0.007]* [0.006]   
men's leisure × somewhat handicapped 0.026   0.046 0.036 
 [0.008]***   [0.022]** [0.009]***
men's leisure × severely handicapped    0.023 0.019 
    [0.012]* [0.007]***
women's leisure × child aged 0-2 0.059 0.06 0.085   
 [0.006]*** [0.013]*** [0.015]***   
women's leisure × child aged 3-10 0.033 0.045 0.028   
 [0.004]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]***   
women's leisure × child aged 11-18 0.003 0.006 0.021   
 [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]***   
men's leisure × child aged 0-2 0.004   0.006 0.01 
 [0.006]   [0.028] [0.030] 
men's leisure × child aged 3-10 -0.004   0.019 -0.009 
 [0.005]   [0.015] [0.026] 
men's leisure × child aged 11-18 -0.007   -0.006 -0.01 
 [0.004]   [0.012] [0.016] 
Observations 40872 4668 5856 900 3800 
Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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